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 Beliefs and actions in the trust game: Creating instrumental variables to 
estimate the causal effect* 
Abstract 
In many economic contexts, an elusive variable of interest is the agent’s belief about rele-
vant events, e.g. about other agents’ behavior. A growing number of surveys and experi-
ments ask participants to state beliefs explicitly but little is known about the causal rela-
tion between beliefs and other behavioral variables. 
This paper discusses the possibility of creating exogenous instrumental variables for be-
lief statements, by informing the agent about exogenous manipulations of the relevant 
events. We conduct trust game experiments where the amount sent back by the second 
player (trustee) is exogenously varied. The procedure allows detecting causal links from 
beliefs to actions under plausible assumptions. The IV-estimated effect is significant, con-
firming the causal role of beliefs. It is only slightly and insignificantly smaller than in 
estimations without instrumentation, consistent with a mild effect of social norms or 
other omitted variables. 
Keywords: Social Capital, trust game, instrumental variables, belief elicitation 
JEL Codes: C72, C81, C91, D84 
Zusammenfassung 
In vielen ökonomischen Zusammenhängen sind die Erwartungen der Spieler bezüglich 
relevanter Ereignisse, z. B. über das Verhalten anderer Spieler, eine schwer zu fassende 
Variable von Interesse. Zwar werden in einer wachsenden Zahl von Untersuchungen und 
Experimenten Teilnehmer gebeten, ihre Erwartungen ausdrücklich zu nennen, jedoch ist 
noch wenig bekannt über die Kausalbeziehung zwischen Erwartungen und anderen Ver-
haltensvariablen. 
In diesem Paper wird die Möglichkeit diskutiert, Instrumente zur Erhebung von Erwartun-
gen zu kreieren, bei denen der Spieler über exogene Manipulationen der relevanten Er-
eignisse informiert wird. Wir führen Experimente zu einem Vertrauensspiel durch, bei 
denen der Betrag, der durch den zweiten Spieler zurückgesendet wird (trustee), exogen 
variiert wird. Dieses Vorgehen erlaubt die Entdeckung kausaler Wirkungsketten von Er-
wartungen auf Entscheidungen unter plausiblen Annahmen. Der IV-geschätzte Effekt ist 
signifikant und bestätigt die kausale Rolle von Erwartungen. Er ist nur wenig kleiner als 
in Schätzungen ohne Instrumentation und konsistent mit einem leichten Effekt sozialer 
Normen oder anderen vernachlässigter Variablen. 
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1 Introduction
In subjective expected utility theory and related models, the agents expectations can be viewed
as a pure as-if construct, meaning that expectations are no more than an elegant, low-dimensional
way of summarizing choice data. According to this view of expectations, choice is represented
by a hypothetical optimization problem that involves maximizing a function of expectations for
example, the expected utility function. But choice is the fundamental concept, and any additional
assumption that one may make about expectations is really an assumption about the nature of
choice. A much more literal interpretation of expectations is that they are real, meaning that they
are independent entities that have some physical incarnation and that can in principle be accessed
directly, for example, by asking people to state them. Much can be said in favour of such a literal
interpretation of expectations, for instance that humans are able to express expectations even
about variables that are irrelevant for their choices. But if expectations are independent entities,
one should be able to inuence them and thereby measure their e¤ect on choices. This leads to the
straightforward empirical question we shall address in this study: are choices driven by beliefs?
This question has important consequences for policy interventions because its answer determines
whether one can induce e¢ cient outcomes through changing peoples expectations. Many policy
campaigns attempt such inuencing from asserting the reality of climate change to bolstering
consumer condence where beliefs are targeted to bring about behavioral change. In particular,
many policy campaigns are geared towards creating trust or optimism, relying on their self-fullling
powers: if the policy maker can induce the agents to be optimistic and trusting about future
outcomes, their subsequent choices may collectively justify the optimism and repay the earlier
trust. The campaign may thus instigate a shift from a less desirable outcome to a better one.
But the role of beliefs rst needs to be a¢ rmed. Researchers have increasingly turned to belief
elicitation procedures where the agents state their expectations explicitly. Trust game experiments
(following Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe, 1995) provide a frequent context for such methods. Fehr,
Fischbacher, Rosenbladt, Schupp and Wagner (2003), Bellemare and Kröger (2007), Sapienza,
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Toldra and Zingales (2007) and Naef and Schupp (2009), among others, ask the participants in
their experiments to state expectations on how much money other players will return if trusted,
and nd a strong correlation as well as much explanatory power when regressing the level of trust
on stated expectations. Yet it remains unanswered whether the variance in trust arises because of
the variance in stated beliefs, or whether the co-variation in the two variables is driven by other,
omitted variables that capture unobservable di¤erences between the participants.
A natural candidate for an omitted variable is the perception of social norms. Take a simple
two-player trust game experiment: the trustor invests in a joint venture, and the trustee can either
appropriate the investment and its return, or repay the rst players trust by sending some money
back. Among the experimental participants who are assigned the role of trustors, presumably some
view a high investment as the rightthing to do, given that it maximizes social surplus and thus
opens up the possibility of mutually benecial exchange. Whether or not such social norms inu-
ence the investment choices may depend on multiple unobservable factors, e.g. the participants
education, cultural inuences or even the framing employed in the experiment. But such unobserv-
ables will inuence both beliefs and actions. In particular, it may be that the same participant who
invests a large amount also predicts that the other participant will return a large amount because
that, too, is arguably the right thing to do. That is, the unobservable perception of whether
or not a social norm of mutual cooperation is relevant can generate a correlation between the
belief statement about the opponents behavior and the players own investment choice without
implying anything about a causal inuence of one variable on the other.
Such a correlation is not necessarily a behavioralphenomenon but can arise as an equilibrium
outcome of a natural game of incomplete information. We develop a simple illustration of this in
Appendix A. Players interact in a mini trust game with just two actions for each player: whether
to trust or not, and whether to reciprocate or not. Both players are aware of the social norm that
prescribes trust and its reciprocation. There prevails some uncertainty about whether deviations
from the social norm will be sanctioned for example, by the possibility that the playersanonymity
be lifted. Players receive signals about the likelihood of sanctions, e.g. from clues in the description
of the choice environment. As both players receive the same description, these signals are correlated.
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The appendix shows that even with relatively little correlation between the players signals the
Bayesian Nash equilibrium involves a strong correlation between the trustors own action and her
belief about the opponents action. The driver of both variables is the trustors perception of the
likelihood of sanctions (a variable that is omitted in most empirical analyses). The example also
shows that despite the strong correlation between the trustors belief and action, an exogenous
shift of the trustors beliefs about the opponents action would have a relatively small e¤ect on her
action. It would therefore be misleading to interpret the strong correlation between beliefs and
actions as saying that one drives the other.
This example only suggests one particular omission in the analysts model yet many other
omitted variables apart from social norms might have an e¤ect on actions, and social norms may
not even be the most relevant one. The examples message is merely that the players may well have
good reasons (here, play an equilibrium in a larger game) to exhibit strong correlations between
beliefs and actions that the researcher may mis-interpret as a causal relation. To measure the e¤ect
of a belief change on actions, one needs more powerful observations than simple correlations.
In Section 2, we introduce a technique to measure the e¤ect in the context of a trust game,
involving the articial creation of an instrumental variable. The game we examine is a simultaneous
version of Berg, Dickhaut and McCabes (1995) trust game and the instrument is a random zero-
mean shift that exogenously increases or reduces the trustees level of re-payment. The realization
of the random shift is known to the trustor, thus a¤ecting her belief about the nal level of re-
payment, and potentially a¤ecting her action. The trustee is informed of the existence of the shift
and of its distribution. However, she is not informed about the realization of the shift, and her
behavior remains una¤ected by the realization.2 The trustors belief about the trustees behavior
(her chosen level of re-payment prior to its manipulation through the shift) should therefore also be
una¤ected by the realization of the shift. Our data conrm these predictions. At the same time, the
2The procedure of replacing one players choice by an exogenous random move has been done in several experi-
mental studies that investigate whether positively reciprocal actions appear only when a certain action is played by a
human agent. See, in the context of the trust game, Cox (2004) among others. In addition to addressing a di¤erent
question, these studies also di¤er from ours because they replace the trustors action by a random move, whereas we
manipulate the trustees move.
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beliefs about the payo¤-relevant event the level of re-payment including the shift react strongly
to the exogenous variation, which is necessary to apply an IV estimation. Regarding the exclusion
restrictionrequirement of IV, that the instrument inuences the actions only via the beliefs about
the level of re-payment, we argue that it is natural to make this assumption because the instrument
is an element of the statistic that the belief is formed about (the level of re-payment), and does
not enter the interaction in any other way. The exogeneity of the shift also rules out that it is
a¤ected by any omitted variable and, conversely, it cannot a¤ect potentially inuential variables
like personal characteristics or perceptions of social norms.
To check for the validity of the design, the trust game is played under two di¤erent conditions
with and without the instrument. The no-instrument condition is a control that serves two key
purposes: it allows checking whether the introduction of the instrumentation technique has any
undesirable inuences on the data generating process and it generates the benchmark naive
estimate of the connection between beliefs and actions. Consistent with the previous literature, we
nd a strong correlation between the two variables.
The IV results, using the data from the instrument condition, indeed establish a causal link
between beliefs and actions. The results reported in Section 3 show that the exogenous belief
variation has a strong and signicant impact on choices. The average marginal (proportional)
e¤ect of beliefs on actions is 0.5, that is, if beliefs about the opponents action increase by ten
percentage points, investments increase by ve percentage points. However, the IV-estimated
e¤ect of beliefs on actions is not quite as strong as the non-instrumented analysis suggests the
coe¢ cient is roughly by one third (yet insignicantly) smaller than the naiveestimate.
These ndings constitute, to our knowledge, the rst laboratory evidence supporting that beliefs
are causal for actions in games. From a methodological point of view, our paper emphasizes
the di¢ culty of ascribing di¤erences in behaviors to observed di¤erences in stated expectations.
Causal links between beliefs and actions were implicitly suggested not only in experiments with
belief elicitation (McKelvey and Page, 1990, O¤erman, Sonnemans and Schram, 1996, Croson,
2000, Huck and Weizsäcker, 2002, Nyarko and Schotter, 2002, and many later studies) but also
in survey studies that use stated expectations about relevant market variables (see Manski, 2004,
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and Attanasio, 2009, for useful overviews). Both literatures contain rich sets of observations that
are consistent with a causal inuence of beliefs on actions, but the endogeneity of beliefs and
actions is rarely addressed in the analyses. Notable exceptions are the papers by Bellemare, Kröger
and van Soest (2008, 2011) and Bellemare, Sebald and Strobel (2011) who estimate structural
econometric models that include covariance between beliefs and actions.3 These models allow
the parameters of an agents other-regarding preference to be jointly determined with beliefs
an endogeneity that is conrmed in the data. In the model of Bellemare, Kröger and van Soest
(2011), the quantitative e¤ect of second-order beliefs on actions is identied even without exogenous
randomization. We view our method of generating instrumental variables as complementary to
these structural approaches. The latter approaches can address endogeneity without interfering
with the decision environment, but the structural formulations are specic to the games that are
studied.
A further important set of close relatives to our paper are eld experiments that vary informa-
tional conditions in di¤erent economic contexts, see e.g. Jensen (2010) and Dupas (2011).4 Under
some assumptions about how information maps into beliefs and actions, one can interpret these
eld studies as evidence for an e¤ect of beliefs on actions. Our experiments complement them
by allowing for a consistent estimate of the size of the e¤ect and by o¤ering results in a clean
laboratory setting. Exogenous variation of articially introduced instruments may be attractive in
other contexts as well, as the designers of experiments and surveys will typically have the freedom
to create such variations. This is further discussed in the papers conclusion in Section 4.
3Bellemare, Kröger and van Soest study rst-order beliefs of proposers (2008) and responders (2011) in the
ultimatum game. Bellemare, Sebald and Strobel (2011) study second-order beliefs in a sequential game akin to the
trust game.
4A related literature is summarized in Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2006, 2009) showing evidence of a causal
role of culture on both actions and beliefs.
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2 Experimental design: Instrumental variables for belief state-
ments
Our experimental design revolves around a continuous trust game with two players. We study two
versions of this game, the game with instrument (Condition I) and the game without the instrument
(Condition NI). In addition to the choice data we collect for each game trustorsbeliefs about the
actions played by the trustees.
The game without the instrument serves as a control. First, it allows for an important empirical
check of the validity of the instrument: whether or not it a¤ects behavior in undesirable ways. In
eld studies that involve IV methods, this is less of a concern as the instrument is usually part of
the natural decision making environment. But with an articial instrument we must check that the
instrumentation technique is neutral in the sense that its presence alone does not distort the data
generating process.
Second, and no less important, the control condition without instrument provides the compari-
son benchmark for our IV results: it is the usual laboratory environment for trust games. It would
be misleading to compare the IV estimates with non-instrumented estimates e.g. OLS using the
data collected under the instrument condition. This is because the instrument a¤ects the beliefs
in a random way so that the beliefs exhibit additional variance. Under the hypothesis that an
omitted variable is at work, the OLS analysis on the data with instrument therefore yields a biased
(attenuated) estimate of the relationship of interest.
We note that in all experimental sessions subjects also played a second type of trust game
with binary actions. This game, too, was played in a variant with and a variant without an
instrument. However, as documented extensively in the papers previous version (Costa-Gomes,
Huck, and Weizsäcker, 2010), the instrument employed in the binary trust game failed our tests for
invasiveness and hence we focus here on the continuous trust game.5
5The instrument used there is di¤erent from the instrument used in the continuous trust game. In the earlier
version we also carefully examine whether the continuous game data can be analysed separately from the binary
data. The experimental design involves four types of trust games (either continuous (CTG) or binary/mini (MTG)
and either with (I) or without an instrument (NI)) and the protocol was such that each subject played just two
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For the collection of belief statments, we employ a quadratic scoring rule that is incentive
compatible in the sense of theoretically eliciting the mean of the subjectively expected distribution,
under the assumption that subjects are risk neutral.6
We conducted our experimental sessions at University College London and at the University
of York, with a roughly equal number of subjects in each treatment at each location, as reported
in Table 1.7 In all, 434 experimental subjects participated in our sessions. Subjects earn points
by playing two games and one belief elicitation task (see footnote 5), which are then converted
into money at an exchange rate of 2.5 pence per point, resulting in an average variable payment of
£ 13.12.8 Sessions lasted about 90 minutes from the moment the subjects were seated until leaving
games (without feedback) ensuring that she would play once in a binary and once in a continuous game, once with
and once without an instrument, and once as a trustor and once as a trustee. Therefore, we had four treatments:
CTG/I&MTG/NI, MTG/NI&CTG/I, CTG/NI&MTG/I and MTG/I&CTG/NI. We detected no spillover from the
binary game onto the continuous trust game data.
6The quadratic scoring rule has been used by numerous researchers and although not all studies agree (see e.g.
Croson, 2000, and Rutstrom and Wilcox, 2009) it is usually not found to be intrusive in the sense of a¤ecting the
playersactions in the games (see e.g. Blanco et al, 2008, Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker, 2008). In our experiment,
the danger of such an intrusion appears minimal, given that we elicit beliefs after the choices. In principle, subjects
could use their belief statement to hedge their position (that is, they could bet on low returns if they have invested
a lot) but such behavior would require extreme sophistication and strong risk aversion.
7The breakdown of participants in the di¤erent treatments was as follows (cf. footnote 5):
Treatment # York Participants # UCL Participants # Total Participants
CTG/I& MTG/NI 62 62 124
MTG/NI&CTG/I 62 58 120
CTG/NI&MTG/I 46 50 96
MTG/I&CTG/NI 48 46 94
8They were also paid a show-up fee of £ 5 at UCL and £ 4 at York, chosen in each case so as to coincide with the
show-up fee of a di¤erent experiment being run at the respective lab at the same time. The overall average payment
including the show-up fee was £ 17.60.
7
the laboratory after collecting their payments.
Condition # York Participants # UCL Participants # Total Participants
I 124 120 244
NI 94 96 190
Table 1: Overview of experimental conditions
2.1 The continuous trust game and the shift instrument
Each of two players initially receives an account that contains 100 points. The trustor, here
labelled participant X, chooses the share a1 of her points that are to be transferred to the
trustee, participant Y. The transfer is productive every point that the trustor sends is tripled
on the way to the trustee. Simultaneously, i.e. without knowing the trustors transfer, the trustee
decides how much to transfer back from the total that she has in her account after Xs transfer.
The trustee, like the trustor, makes a decision about a relative transfer sharea2, not an absolute
amount.
The transfer shares a1 and a2 are restricted to lie in the interval [0:2; 0:8]. Thus the trustor can
transfer between 20 and 80 points, which are tripled and added to the trustees amount, resulting
in an account balance for the trustee between 160 and 340 points. Of these points, the trustee can
transfer back a share of between 0:2 and 0:8 but has to do so without knowing the exact balance in
her account. This simultaneous version of the trust game has the advantage that the trustors belief
about the trustees transfer share is a comparatively simple object a distribution over [0:2; 0:8].
(In the sequential version the trustors beliefs would specify such a distribution for each possible
action of her own.)
The instrumental variable is a shift z that increases or decreases the trustees transfer share by
a value between  0:2 and 0:2, drawn from a uniform probability distribution over the 41 values on
the grid f 0:2; 0:19; :::; 0; :::; 0:19; 0:2g. Both participants are informed that the trustees transfer
share a2 is added to the zero-mean random variable z. The trustor is, in addition, informed about
8
a1
z
a1
a2 + z
f(a1)
a2
Figure 1: Illustration of the continuous trust game with instrument. Player 2 knows only the
distribution of z and chooses action a2. Player 1 knows the distribution of z and the value of z
before choosing action a1 and belief statement b1. f(a1) indicates that player 2s account balance
depends on a1.
the realized value of z, while the trustee is not.
For example, suppose that upon being informed that the realization of the shift z is 0:05, the
trustor transfers a share a1 = 0:5 of her initial balance of 100 points. This would lead to intermediate
account balances of 50 and 250 points for the trustor and trustee, respectively. Suppose further
that the trustee decides to transfer a2 = 0:25. Hence, the actual transfer to the trustor would be a
share of 0:3 (= 0:25 + 0:05) of the trustees intermediate balance, leading to nal balances of 125
and 175 points for the trustor and trustee, respectively. The games rules are illustrated in Figure
1.
We explained the shifter z to participants as follows (for full instructions, see Appendix C):
There is one important detail about the transfer out of Participant Ys account. The
computer adjusts the share that is actually transferred from Participant Ys account
to Participant Xs account. More specically, the computer will adjust Ys transfer
share in a random way, increasing or reducing it by up to 20 percentage points. That
is, the computer will generate a number that we call CHANGE TO Ys TRANSFER
SHARE by picking a random percentage number among -20%, -19%, . . . , 0%, . . . ,
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+19%, +20%. Each of the whole-numbered percentages in this range is equally likely.
The instructions continue by giving a further illustration of the instrumental variable and its
e¤ects on payo¤s.
After making their choices, the trustor is asked to report her belief statement about the trustees
adjusted transfer share, i.e. about the sum ea2 = a2+z. The belief statement is rewarded according
to the quadratic scoring rule
b = A  c(ea2   b1)2,
where b1 is Participant Xs belief statement about Participant Ys transfer share, and the parameter
values are A = c = 250 points. This elicitation procedure applies both when the game is played
with and without the instrument when played without the instrument, the trustor is simply asked
about the trustees transfer a2. At the time when participants choose the actions in the game, none
of them is made aware of the subsequent belief elicitation task.
Importantly, the instrument z is generated independently of all other relevant random variables.
This property justies the exogeneity assumption required for IV. Consider the bivariate linear
projection of the trustors transfer share a1 on her stated beliefs b1:
a1 = 0 + 1b1 + u (1)
The exclusion restrictionrequires that while the error term u can, in general, be confounded with
b1, e.g. due to omitted variables, the instrumental variable z needs to be orthogonal to u.9 To see
how this property helps in nding the causal link between b1 and a1, consider the simple logic of
two-stage least squares regression: the analyst regresses a1 on z, resulting in a slope coe¢ cient a;z,
and also regresses b1 on z, resulting in a coe¢ cient b;z. If the only way in which z inuences a1 is
through its e¤ect on b1 (i.e. z and u are orthogonal), it follows that the e¤ect of b1 on a1 must be
a;z
b;z
times as large as the e¤ect of z on b1. That is, the causal e¤ect of b1 on a1 is consistently estimated
9 If control variables like demographic, socio-economic, and cognitive skills are included, the analogous statement
with the corresponding error term of the regression on beliefs and controls is required. See e.g. Angrist and Pischke
(2009) for a wider discussion of exclusion restrictions. In the regressions of the next section, we use Tobit instead of
OLS models, but the same logic applies for Tobit.
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by
a;z
b;z
. The exclusion restriction is therefore key for the causal inference indeed we designed the
experiment to make it maximally plausible. Since z is independently generated in the laboratory,
we can rule out that u has an inuence on z , or that any omitted variable may co-determine u and
z. It remains an assertion that z does not inuence u. We regard this as a reasonable assertion
because z is a summand of ea2, which is the statistic that beliefs b1 are formed about, and because
z does not enter the interaction in any other way.10 Section 3 will contain results that demonstrate
that belief statements are indeed strongly responsive to z. In fact, participants respond in a way
that is fully consistent with the hypothesis that they simply add z to their beliefs about a2.
3 Results
3.1 Preliminaries: Data pooling, descriptive summary and checks for invasive-
ness of the instrument procedure
Data Pooling. We rst determine if there are any statistically signicant di¤erences between the
data collected at UCL and at York, and whether there are any order e¤ects on either actions or
stated beliefs (recall that each participant played two versions of the trust game). The absence of
major di¤erences allows us to pool the data and simplify the subsequent analysis.
Initially, we pair the two treatments in which the game was played under the same instrument
condition at each of the locations, thereby testing for order e¤ects. The absence of such order
e¤ects leads us to pool the data and test for laboratory e¤ects, by comparing the data collected at
the two di¤erent locations. We apply Kolmogorov-Smirnovs two-sample exact test to both players
transfer shares and to the trustors belief statements and nd no statistically signicant order or
laboratory e¤ects, for any of the player roles or for any instrument condition.11 Therefore, in the
10Of course, the functional form assumption is never innocuous but this is a general feature of regression analyses.
We also note that if one is willing to maintain linearity assumptions, the exogeneity of z and u should hold true for
much wider classes of preferences over payo¤ distributions than the money-maximizing-agent model.
11The twelve tests on the order and laboratory e¤ects all produced p-values above 0.1, with the exception of the
test for order e¤ects on the trustees transfer share in the instrument condition run at York, for which we obtain a
p-value of 0.003. Since our data analysis focuses on the trustors, the rejection of the null hypothesis for trustees at
York is not problematic.
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subsequent data analysis we use the pooled data played under each instrument condition.
Data summary and checks for invasiveness. As part of the data summary, we examine whether the
presence of an instrument has undesired e¤ects on how subjects play the games. More specically,
we want to make sure that the mere introduction of the instrument does not a¤ect the behavioral
variables except through the channel of inuencing the beliefs. We focus on the trustors data as
the trustees role in this study is accessory and only serves the purpose of generating an uncertain
re-payment.
Our rst step is to use the beliefs stated under the instrument condition (the beliefs about
the trustees adjusted transfer share after manipulation through the instrument) to construct
the underlying beliefs about the behavior of the human opponent. We then check whether these
inferred underlying beliefs are admissible, i.e., whether one could hold such beliefs about the
trustees transfer share. More concretely, suppose that upon being informed that the shift is equal
to z the trustor states that her expectation of ea2 is a share equal to b1. Her underlying belief is
then inferred to be b1   z and the stated belief b1 is deemed admissible if the underlying belief
b1 z is in [0:2; 0:8], the interval of transfer shares the trustee can choose from. A stated belief whose
underlying belief falls outside this interval is inadmissibleand indicates a potential confusion on
behalf of the trustor subject. We nd that only 5 subjectsbeliefs (4% of trustors in Condition
I) are inadmissible, a low percentage.12 For consistency, we exclude these 5 subjects from the
analysis, unless mentioned otherwise.
Next, we check whether the instrument has any undesirable e¤ect on the behavioral variables.
The shifts expected value is zero, and thus non-invasiveness requires that none of the behavioral
variables exhibits a signicant change in means between the treatments with and without the shift.
We rst summarize the distribution of transfer shares. In the game without instrument (Condition
NI) the transfer shares of the trustors follow a familiar tri-modal pattern that has been observed
in many other trust game experiments, with substantial proportions of participants choosing the
12Note that expressing an inadmissible belief is a strictly dominated decision, and that their low frequency is
actually lower than the frequencies of dominated actions in games, see e.g. Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006).
Additional evidence of a high level of logical consistency of trustorsstated beliefs is provided by the frequencies of
observing multiples of 5% in the data, referred to at the end of this subsection.
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lowest possible transfer (here, a transfer share of 0:2, chosen by 32:6%), or the midpoint of the action
space (0:5 transfer share, chosen by 19:0%) or the highest possible transfer share (0:8, chosen by
14:7%). The remaining observations are dispersed between these three modes. As can been seen
in Table 2, the sample mean of the trustors transfer share is 0:427, with a standard deviation of
0:218. For comparison, in the game with instrument (Condition I) the frequencies of transfer shares
that lie on the points of the simple three-point grid f0:2; 0:5; 0:8g are 29:9%, 7:7% and 19:7%, and
the mean transfer share is 0:435 (std. dev. 0:226).13
Condition NI I (All) I (admissibledata)
Trustors transfer share 0.427 0.435 0.440
(0.218) (0.226) (0.227)
Trustees transfer share 0.306 0.303 0.303
(0.144) (0.150) (0.150)
Trustors belief about - 0.330 0.331
adjusted transfer share ea2 (0.185) (0.178)
Trustors belief about 0.350 - -
transfer share a2 (0.132)
Shift z - -0.008 -0.013
(-) (0.121) (0.119)
Table 2: Summary of behavioral variables and shift
We conclude that with the single exception of observing fewer transfer shares at level 0:5, the
features of the action data under both conditions are very similar. In particular, their means and
standard deviations are close to identical and statistical tests cannot reject the hypothesis that the
13Note that in CTG/I, if the shift z weakly exceeds 0:14, it is a dominant strategy for the trustor to transfer a
share of 0:8, since the amount that she transfers is multiplied by three, and she is guaranteed to receive at least 0:34
of this total amount. In the 22 instances with shifts greater than or equal to 0:14, the trustors comply with this
prediction 7 times.
13
distributions are held constant. The same holds true for the trusteestransfer shares.14
Now consider the trustors belief about the trustees transfer share. In Condition NI, its mean
is 0:350 (std. dev. 0:132), away from its target by less than 5 percentage points. The corresponding
numbers for the game with the instrument, Condition I, are close in terms of mean (0:330) but
the presence of the instrument induces additional variance in the belief statements as it should
because the shift is random and a rational subject adds the shift to her belief about the opponent.
Even the size of the variance di¤erence is very close to the predicted e¤ect under the assumption
that the subjects add the shift to their beliefs.15 Further evidence on this is given by the fre-
quency of belief statements on a grid with stepsize 5%: in 79:5% of our observations in Condition
I are the (b1; z)-pairs consistent with the hypothesis that the participants simply add their value
of z to a belief about a2 that lies on the grid f0:2; 0:25; 0:3; 0:35; :::g.16 In Figure 2, we provide
graphical evidence of this regularity. In the gure, the red line represents the target, which is
given by the mean behavior of trustees in Condition I plus a trustors specic value of z. This
lines slope is equal to one, and the set of points on the line correspond to the set of ex-post op-
timal belief statements, conditional on the subjects information z. The black line is the Tobit
regression line generated from the depicted data. As the gure shows, a prominent feature of the
14For the NI/I comparison of action data we conducted for each player role a Mann-Whitney test as well as a
variance ratio test. None of the tests rejects the corresponding null at any conventional level.
15Under the assumption that the participants in Condition I arrive at their belief statements by simply adding
the shift variable z to their (exogenous) belief about a2, the two variables belief about a2and z are independent
and their sum of variances is thus equal to the variance of their sums. Counterfactually assuming that subjects in
Condition NI were to observe the same realizations of z and add them to their beliefs, one can analogously construct
a variance of hypothetical beliefs about ea2 in Condition NI, and compare it to the observed variance of beliefs
about ea2 in Condition I. The comparison supports the hypothesis that beliefs about the underlying a2 are constant:
the standard deviation of simulated beliefs in Condition NI is 0:181, very close to the standard deviation of stated
beliefs in Condition I (0:178).
16For comparison, in Condition NI, 90.5% of stated beliefs about the transfer share are multiples of 5%. Stated
beliefs about the "adjusted transfer share" ea2 in Condition I are multiples of 5% in only 39.3% of all cases, indicating
that many subjects form a well-dened underlying belief on the grid and then add z. For further comparison, Costa-
Gomes and Weizsäcker (2008) also nd in their 3x3 games that subjects state beliefs that are multiples of 5 percentage
points around 90% of the time.
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Figure 2: Trustorsstated beliefs upon observing transfer shifts z.
data is that the large majority of (b1; z)-pairs lie on straight lines. The fact that the regression
line has a slope that is statistically indistinguishable from unity (0:841, std. dev. 0:116) is also
consistent with the overall picture that many subjects appear to add the instrument to an un-
derlying belief, as predicted. Finally, a comparison of the second and third columns of Table 2
shows that the exclusion of the inadmissible data does not have much of an e¤ect on the sample
statistics.
In sum, the data analyses in this subsection show that introducing the instrument has no
undesirable side e¤ects on the distributions of the behavioral variables and that any di¤erences
conform to the theoretical predictions of the instruments e¤ects. We therefore conclude that we
can proceed to the IV analysis of data from Condition I and compare its results to the benchmark
data from Condition NI.
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3.2 Regression analysis: The causal e¤ects of beliefs
In this subsection we present the regression results to assess the causality of beliefs for actions. As
discussed in Section 2 we write trustor is transfer share a1i as a linear function of her stated belief
b1i and a vector of control variables xi of self-reported demographic information, socio-economic
indicators, cognitive skills, and measures of trust:17
a1i = 0 + 1b1i + 2xi + ui (2)
Since a1i is censored at 0.2 and 0.8 we regard it as a latent variable that underlies the observed
value a1i;18
a1i =
8>>><>>>:
0:2 if a1i < 0:2
a1i if 0:2  a1i  0:8
0:8 if a1i > 0:8
For the instrumentation in Condition I we also write trustor is stated belief b1i as a linear
function of the transfer shift zi and control variables.19 We rst use a two-limit censored Tobit
model to estimate the relation between the latent trustors transfer shares a1i and their stated
beliefs (as in expression 2) in the NI data, both with and without control variables. This is the
analysis that one would carry out in order to establish causality in the absence of endogeneity
problems. The results are in Table 4 (standard errors in parentheses; detailed control variables
estimates in Table 1A of Appendix B). The Tobit estimates show a strong correlation of trustors
stated beliefs and their transfer shares, with a slope coe¢ cient of 1:317.20 Taking into account
the e¤ect of data censoring at transfer shares of 0:2 and 0:8, the result of column (1) translates
17See Appendix C for the exact wording of the questionnaire.
18 In Condition NI, 31 and 14 observations out of a total of 95 are at the lower and upper limits, respectively. In
Condition I, 35 and 23 out of a total of 117 observations are at the lower and upper limits, respectively.
19The dependent variable is doubly censored at 0 and 1 but these two belief values appear in less than 5% of the
observations.
20 In this and subsequent tables, the goodness of t is measured by bR2, denoting the correlation between predicted
and the observed values of the dependent variable. The di¤erence in the number of observations between columns
(1) and (2) is due to non-response values in the personal questionnaire.
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(via post-regression analysis) into an average marginal e¤ect of 0:722. That is, on average for all
observations, including those at the boundary, an increase in the belief of 10 percentage points
translates into an increase of 7:2 percentage points in the transfer share. In the regression with
controls, the estimated e¤ect is even larger, with a slope of 1:638 that translates into an average
marginal e¤ect of 0:89.21
Transfer Share in Condition NI
(1) (2)
Tobit Tobit
Belief statement 1.317 (0.288) 1.638 (0.308)
Constant -0.090 (0.112) 0.507 (0.439)
Personal controls no yes
# of Obs. 95 92bR2 0.214 0.402
Table 4: Regressions estimates of trustorstransfer shares in Condition NI.
A naiveattribution of these statistical connections to a causal e¤ect would thus suggest that
beliefs are a strong driver of trust. The papers main question is whether this attribution can
be corroborated by the IV results. Table 5 has the IV Tobit results from Condition I, showing
that the answer is a¢ rmative. As indicated in column (3) of Table 5, the IV coe¢ cient without
control variables is estimated at 1.004. This is insignicantly smaller than the non-instrumented
coe¢ cient in Condition NI.22 However, the most important aspect of the IV results is that the
21The estimates in Appendix B show that age has a statistically signicantly negative e¤ect on the transfer share,
while the subjects fathers level of education, living with a partner, and having a loan as the main source of income
have signicantly positive coe¢ cients. However, none of these four e¤ects extends to the data from Condition I. Three
observations were dropped in the regression with controls due to subjects not answering some of the questionnaires
questions.
22To obtain a statistical test for the comparison, we use the estimated standard deviations of both slope coe¢ cient
estimates. The estimates are independent and asymptotically normal. Under the null hypothesis of equal slope coef-
cients, the standard deviation of the di¤erence between the slope estimates is thus estimated as
p
0:3892 + 0:2882 =
0:484. The estimated slope di¤erence of 1:317   1:004 = 0:313 is within one estimated standard deviation around
zero and has a t-value of 0:313
0:484
= 0:647. Comparing the coe¢ cients from regressions with controls, the analogously
17
coe¢ cient is substantial and signicantly di¤erent from zero. The average marginal e¤ect is 0.5.23
To our knowledge this is the rst evidence (with the important qualier about the structural work
discussed in the Introduction) that the correlation between rst-order beliefs and actions in an
experimental game is indeed causal.
Transfer Share in Condition I
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tobit Tobit IV Tobit IV Tobit
Belief statement 0.936 (0.230) 1.008 (0.231) 1.004 (0.389) 0.959 (0.408)
Constant 0.098 (0.086) 0.323 (.454) 0.075 (0.135) 0.343 (0.476)
Personal controls no yes no yes
# of Obs. 117 116 117 116bR2 0.149 0.254 0.149 0.167
Table 5: Regressions estimates of trustorstransfer shares in Condition I.
The results also show that within Condition I, there is no discernible di¤erence in the results of
Tobit versus IV Tobit. This is another indication that there cannot be a strong omitted-variable
problem. One may worry about the observation that the Tobit coe¢ cients di¤er between Condi-
tions NI and I. The di¤erence is insignicant, however, in a regression that includes all main and
interaction e¤ects of conditions and belief statements.24 A further indication that omitted vari-
ables do not play a large role is that the regressions with personal control variables yield essentially
unchanged results.
standard deviation is
p
0:4082 + 0:3082 = 0:511 and the slope di¤erence has a t-value of 1:638 0:959
0:511
= 1: 329. The
IV Tobit coe¢ cient is also insignicantly larger than the Tobit coe¢ cient from the data with instrument, but this
in itself is not an interesting observation because the belief statements in the condition with instrument have been
a¤ected, as they should, by the introduction of the instrument. (Cf. page 6.)
23The estimates in Appendix B show that none of the control variables has a statistically signicant e¤ect on the
transfer share in the IV regression.
24To the extent that there is a di¤erence between the two treatments, it could be generated by reciprocity: under
Condition NI, trustors may want to be kind to their opponents if they expect them to be kind as well. In Condition
I, part of the belief is driven by the computer draw, so a reciprocal agent may respond less to this belief.
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In Table 6 we also report the direct e¤ect of the instrument on the trustors transfer share.
The results conrm directly that the exogenous variation has a signicant e¤ect on the trustors
transfer share. The impact of an increase in the shift is comparable to the change associated with
a corresponding increase in the stated belief in Condition NI (0:807 versus 1:317, in regressions
without controls). However, the coe¢ cient here does not indicate a measure for the size of the
e¤ect of beliefs on actions, merely the size of the e¤ect of the articial instrument on actions.
Transfer share in Condition I
(1) (2)
Tobit Tobit
Shift 0.807 (0.337) 0.763 (0.344)
Constant 0.416 (0.040) 0.739 (0.479)
Personal controls no yes
# of Obs. 117 116bR2 0.059 0.138
Table 6: Regressions of trustorstransfer shares on shift in Condition I.
4 Conclusion
The paper makes two contributions. First, adding to the previous structural approaches discussed
in the Introduction, it establishes that there is a causal link between beliefs and actions in an
investment/trust game. The nding conrms the implicit supposition of such a link in many
previous analyses of stated beliefs, both in surveys and in experiments. The question of causality
between beliefs and actions is potentially relevant for many applied policy issues, and we point
out that our "positive" evidence may not generalize to contexts outside of the clean laboratory
environment.
Second, the paper discusses a new method for laboratory experiments articially created
instruments that can also be employed to examine other questions. It has always been the hall-
mark of experimental economics to manipulate directly the explanatory variables of interest, allow-
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ing causal insight. Indeed, this is the main reason for why experiments have become so popular.
But in some contexts, the explanatory variable of interest is by its very nature an endogenous vari-
able, and thus cannot be fully controlled even by an experimenter. Yet in such contexts, one can
at least inuence the explanatory variable of interest to some degree, by way of using instrumental
variables. Under standard linearity assumptions, this su¢ ces to measure causal links. Non-linear
specications may follow in subsequent research, as may the combination of exogenous randomiza-
tion with structural-model estimations. Similar procedures to ours may also be applied in studies
where the explanatory variable of interest is of a di¤erent nature, but is likewise endogenous to the
choice process: for example, information about past outcomes, responses to attitudinal questions,
happiness reports or even neurological data. To our knowledge, Gill and Prowse (2011) is the only
existing paper that employs an instrumental variable created in a laboratory their method allows
inference about the e¤ect of past successes in tournament games.25
An unusual feature of our study is that we explicitly question the link between expectations and
actions yet traditionally expectations are, at least under subjective expected utility, not viewed
as a concept that is separate from actions. We acknowledge that we do not o¤er an alternative
denition of expectations or a general decision-theoretic view on the topic, instead we simply take
belief statements as our data. But the statistical establishment of a causal link between expectations
and actions is at least pragmatic. Indeed the empirical link may be the only thing that matters for
a policy maker who runs a campaign to change expectations, in order to accomplish a behavioral
change.
25 In the literature on eld experiments, articial instruments have been employed to measure the e¤ect of infor-
mation (Duo and Saez 2003) or technology adoption (Devoto et al. 2011) or to avoid selection e¤ects in subsequent
experimental interaction of participants (List and Millimet 2008).
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5 Appendix A: An example of naive inference under omitted vari-
ables and equilibrium play
In this section we give an example of how the correlation between belief statements and actions can
be misleading in the presence of omitted variables. To arrive at a misleadinge¤ect, we imagine
that a researcher observes the full data (choices and belief statements about the opponents choices)
but ignores the possibility of a social norm, or any other unobserved variable, that could drive
behavior and belief statements. The players, in contrast, are aware of the full model and play the
unique Bayes-Nash Equilibrium (BNE) of the game.
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The example builds on a 2x2 mini trust game, where player 1 can either trust (a1 = 1) or not
(a1 = 0) and player 2 can reciprocate (a2 = 1) or not (a2 = 0). The players are aware of a social
norm that prescribes trust and reciprocation (a1 = a2 = 1). A random event species whether
violations of the social norm are sanctioned: in state ! = 1, violations are sanctioned, and we
assume that this state arises with probability 12 . If ! = 1 occurs, player is utility is penalized by a
term i if she does not comply with the norm but plays ai = 0 instead. The punishment parameter
i is known to the player herself but not to her opponent, who only knows the distribution of i to
be uniform over [0; 1]. If ! = 0, no punishment applies.
A possible justication for such a probabilistic social norm enforcement is that with probability
1
2 the interaction does not remain anonymous. For example, an outside observer (say, the exper-
imenter) may impose a punishment i on non-cooperative play. Or, the players meet afterwards
and may be compelled to reveal their play in the game. In this case, the punishment parameter i
would reect the extent of embarrassment. The payo¤s (1; 2) in the two states are as follows.
! = 0 Player 2
a2 = 0 a2 = 1
Player 1 a1 = 0 0; 0 0; 0
a1 = 1  1; 2 1; 1
! = 1 Player 2
a2 = 0 a2 = 1
Player 1 a1 = 0  1; 2  1; 0
a1 = 1  1; 2  2 1; 1
We assume that the two punishment terms 1 and 2 are i:i:d: uniformly distributed on the
interval [0; 1]. The worst feasible punishment, i = 1, makes the non-cooperative action ai = 0
weakly dominated for player i, under state ! = 1. The smallest possible punishment for player
2, 2 = 0, makes player 2s non-cooperative action a2 = 0 weakly dominant (independent of !).
Player 1s optimal action depends on !, too, but as usual in the trust game it also depends on her
belief about a2 for a large expected return, it pays o¤ to trust.
While players do not know the true state ! for sure, they each receive a signal si that has
precision 23 . That is, Pr(si = 1j! = 1) = Pr(si = 0j! = 0) = 23 , for i = 1; 2. Their information
about ! is therefore correlated: players know that it is more likely than not that the opponent
receives the same signal. The probability of the opponent having the same signal is 59 (and the
correlation coe¢ cient between the two playerssignals is 19).
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In this Bayesian game, a players type is given by her signal si and her punishment payo¤ i.
We assume for simplicity that the punishments (1; 2) are independent of the signals (s1; s2). It
is then straightforward to determine the playersoptimal choice probabilities: for any signal si and
any belief about the opponents strategy, we rst ask what values of i make it optimal for the
player to choose the cooperative action ai = 1. The answer yields a cuto¤ value bi(si), such that
for i  bi(si), the player chooses ai = 1. Each player i employs two such cuto¤s, one for each
signal realization, si 2 f0; 1g. Player i also entertains a belief about the opponents cooperation:
Pr(aj = 1jsi) =
P esj2f0;1g Pr(sj = esj jsi)(1 Pr(j < bj(esj))). This belief determines player is two
cuto¤s, and the BNE solution is then found by solving for a set of four cuto¤s that form a xed
point. To nd the solution, we aggregate over the possible range of punishment parameters and
denote the choice probabilities under the playersequilibrium strategies by r = Pr(a1 = 1js1 = 0) =
1   b1(s1 = 0); s = Pr(a1 = 1js1 = 1) = 1   b1(s1 = 1); t = Pr(a2 = 1js2 = 0) = 1   b2(s2 = 0);
and u = Pr(a2 = 1js2 = 1) = 1   b2(s2 = 1). To nd e.g. the cuto¤ value b1(s1 = 1) that makes
player 1 indi¤erent upon signal s1 = 1, we solve
E[1(a1 = 0js1 = 1; b1(s1 = 1))] = E[1(a1 = 1js1 = 1; b1(s1 = 1))]
2
3
( b1(s1 = 1)) = Pr(a2 = 0js1 = 1)  ( 1) + Pr(a2 = 1js1 = 1)  1
which can be rewritten as:
s =
3
2
(
8
9
t+
10
9
u)  1
2
Formulating analogous expressions for r; t and u allows to solve for the unique equilibrium values
fr = 0; s = 35 ; t = 15 ; u = 12g. We see that in equilibrium, both players react strongly to their signals
as s exceeds r and u exceeds t, both by a considerable margin.26
Now consider a naive researcher who wants to infer the causal e¤ect of player 1s beliefs on
her actions. We dene a naive researcher as one who is not aware that the information structure
determines the players beliefs and actions. Rather, the researcher views the players beliefs as
exogenous and does not require that they are in equilibrium. The researcher collects player-1 data
on actions and belief statements about player-2 actions, which we assume are reported truthfully,
26The equilibrium is in (essentially) pure strategies, as a player with a given type has a strict best response, except
for the zero-probability event that her realized value i makes her indi¤erent, i.e. i = bi(si).
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generated by the full model with social norms. The researcher will therefore observe two di¤erent
belief statements: rst, when player 1 receives the signal s1 = 1, she reports the belief that her
opponent cooperates with probability
Pr(a2 = 1js1 = 1) = 5
9
u+
4
9
t =
11
30
:
Under this signal realization s1 = 1, we saw above that her actions are cooperative with probability
3
5 . Second, when player 1 receives the signal s1 = 0 she reports that her opponent cooperates with
probability
Pr(a2 = 1js1 = 0) = 4
9
u+
5
9
t =
1
3
,
and her actions under this signal realization are cooperative with probability 0. The data on player
1 that the researcher observes can therefore be summarized in the following table (where the cell
entries indicate the relative frequency of the four possible belief-action pairs):
Player 1 Belief statements
bs1 =
11
30 bs1 =
1
3
Actions a1 = 0 210
1
2
a1 = 1
3
10 0
As the naive researcher ignores the existence of the social norm, he will also wrongly assign
causal e¤ects: we assume that he attributes any change in actions exclusively to changes in beliefs.
(We also assume that the researcher is not puzzled by the fact that not all actions are best responses
to stated beliefs. One could write down a simple error model of what the researcher has in mind,
but this would not add much beyond the verbal statement in the sentence before these parentheses.)
He therefore believes that if he could intervene and inuence playersbeliefs, he would also inuence
playersactions as prescribed by the frequencies in the data matrix. In particular, let us suppose
that he thinks he could convince all members of the player-1 population who hold the belief of 13
(i.e. one half of the population) to increase their belief by 130 . These player 1s would then hold the
same belief as the other half of the population. After such an intervention, the naive researcher
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would expect the actions to change in accordance to the di¤erence between the columns of the
above data matrix. He would thus expect the following data after the intervention:
Player 1 Belief statements
bs1 =
11
30 bs1 =
1
3
Actions a1 = 0 25 0
a1 = 1
3
5 0
But what would the actual e¤ects be of such an intervention, given the true model? To nd the
answer, the researcher could use a simple announcement: he could address all player 1s whose belief
statement is 13 , explaining to them that in one out of 20 times, their opponent would be replaced by
a robot that always cooperates.27 In the above equilibrium, and starting from the belief 13 , a player
with signal s1 = 0 would indeed arrive at a belief that the opponent cooperates with probability
11
30 , as one can easily check:
Pr(opponent cooperatesjs1 = 0) = 19
20
Pr(a2 = 1js1 = 0) + 1
20
=
19
20
1
3
+
1
20
=
11
30
Under the true model, what would be the e¤ect of the announcement on player 1s cooperation
rate? What the naive researcher misses is that even under the above announcement, a player 1
with signal s1 = 0 would still assign a low probability to the event that a non-cooperative action
would be penalized. She would therefore still nd the non-cooperative action a1 = 0 relatively
attractive the omitted variable thus reduces the benecial e¤ect of the belief shift.
To nd the size of the e¤ect, we consider the relevant cuto¤ b1(s1 = 0), after the announcement.
The indi¤erence condition is:
27To be precise, the announcement must be made after the researcher observes the player 1s intended actions
and belief statements, but before the game is played. Importantly, for this example, the researcher must not inform
player 2 about this intervention, because she would otherwise change her equilibrium behavior. Here in the theoretical
example such trickery may be acceptable for the sake of exposition. In our experiments, both players are told about
the possibility of intervention, so that no deception is used.
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E[1(a1 = 0js1 = 0; b1(s1 = 0))] = E[1(a1 = 1js1 = 0; b1(s1 = 0))]
1
3
( b1(s1 = 0)) = 1920(Pr(a2 = 1js1 = 0)1 + (1  Pr(a2 = 1js1 = 0))( 1)) + 1201
1
3
( b1(s1 = 0)) = 1920(13   23) + 1201b1(s1 = 0) = 45
Thus only a proportion of Pr(1  45) = 15 of the players with s1 = 0 would cooperate and the new
data matrix after the announcement is
Player 1 Belief statements
bs1 =
11
30 bs1 =
1
3
Actions a1 = 0 35 0
a1 = 1
2
5 0
We conclude that by looking at the frequencies instead of measuring the e¤ect, the naive re-
searcher would considerably overestimate the causal link between beliefs and actions. Under the
true model, only one fth of the announcements recipients would change their actions.
6 Appendix B: Regression tables
The following tables replicate Tables 4 through 6 but contain the full sets of coe¢ cient estimates.
The data on personal characteristics are self reported at the end of the experimental session (see
instructions in Appendix C).
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Transfer share, Condition NI
(1) (2)
Tobit Tobit
Belief statement 1.317 (0.288) 1.638 (0.308)
Age -0.036 (0.011)
Sex 0.009 (0.071)
Monthly budget/1000 0.098 (0.1335)
Works for money 0.047 (0.091)
Lives (alone) 0.151 (0.113)
Lives (with partner) 0.359 (0.157)
Lives (with children) 0.121 (0.175)
Lives (with others) 0.113 (0.092)
Math Course at UG level 0.002 (0.072)
# Years of mothers education -0.023 (0.014)
# Years of fathers education 0.033 (0.014)
Trusts People -0.054 (0.058)
Expected prob. lost item returned 0.001 (0.001)
Good detector trustworthy people -0.009 (0.040)
# Correct math questions -0.048 (0.037)
Income source (work) 0.058 (0.140)
Income source (scolarship) 0.129 (0.140)
Income source (loan) 0.375 (0.110)
Income source (savings) 0.198 (0.124)
Income source (other) 0.114 (0.112)
Constant -0.090 (0.112) 0.507 (0.439)
# of Obs. 95 92bR2 0.214 0.402
Table A1: Transfer shares in Condition NI. Note: "Lives_i" indicates co-habitation in participants
household, with baseline category "with parents"; "Income source_i" indicates main source of income with
baseline category"parents"; "Trusts people", "Expect prob. lost item returned" and "Good detector"
correspond to survey questions about trust and trustworthiness (standard deviations in parentheses).
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Transfer share, Condition I
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tobit Tobit IV Tobit IV Tobit
Belief statement 0.936 (0.230) 1.01 (0.231) 1.004 (0.389) 0.959 (0.408)
Age -0.000 (0.011) -0.000 (0.012)
Sex 0.002 (0.083) 0.004 (0.084)
Monthly budget/1000 -0.007 (0.154) 0.006 (0.155)
Works for money -0.018 (0.087) -0.020 (0.089)
Lives (alone) -0.148 (0.130) -0.147 (0.130)
Lives (with partner) -0.293 (0.164) -0.285 (0.175)
Lives (with children) 0.254 (0.523) 0.256 (0.523)
Lives (with others) 0.03 (0.089) 0.029 (0.089)
Math Course at UG level 0.062 (0.079) 0.061 (0.079)
# Years of mothers education -0.010 (0.013) -0.010 (0.013)
# Years of fathers education 0.002 (0.012) 0.002 (0.012)
Trusts People -0.033 (0.057) -0.030 (0.059)
Expected prob. lost item returned -0.000 (0.001) -0.000 (0.002)
Good detector trustworthy people -0.025 (0.050) -0.026 (0.050)
# Correct math questions 0.014 (0.034) 0.014 (0.034)
Income source (work) 0.001 (0.165) 0.003 (0.165)
Income source (scolarship) -0.075 (0.110) -0.078 (0.112)
Income source (loan) -0.058 (0.111) -0.060 (0.113)
Income source (savings) -0.183 (0.148) -0.176 (0.156)
Income source (other) -0.155 (0.124) -0.158 (0.126)
Constant 0.098 (0.086) 0.323 (0.455) 0.075 (0.135) 0.343 (0.478)
# of Obs. 117 116 117 116bR2 0.149 0.254 0.149 0.167
Table A2: Transfer shares in Condition I. Note: See Table A1.
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Transfer share, Condition I
(1) (2)
Tobit Tobit
Shift (z) 0.807 (0.337) 0.763 (0.344)
Age -0.001 (0.013)
Sex 0.055 (0.089)
Monthly budget/1000 -0.001 (0.167)
Works for money -0.043 (0.093)
Lives (alone) -0.096 (0.139)
Lives (with partner) -0.165 (0.174)
Lives (with children) 0.278 (0.568)
Lives (with others) 0.029 (0.096)
Math Course at UG level 0.067 (0.086)
# Years of mothers education -0.011 (0.014)
# Years of fathers education -0.003 (0.013)
Trusts People -0.007 (0.061)
Expected prob. lost item returned 0.000 (0.002)
Good detector trustworthy people -0.039 (0.054)
# Correct math questions 0.004 (0.037)
Income source (work) -0.033 (0.182)
Income source (scolarship) -0.134 (0.118)
Income source (loan) -0.090 (0.120)
Income source (savings) -0.097 (0.156)
Income source (other) -0.191 (0.134)
Constant 0.416 (0.040) 0.740 (0.480)
# of Obs. 117 116bR2 0.059 0.138
Table A3: Transfer shares in Condition I. Note: See Table A1.
7 Appendix C: Instructions28
WELCOME!
PLEASE WAIT UNTIL THE EXPERIMENTER TELLS YOU TO START!
You are about to participate in an experiment in decision making. Universities and research
foundations have provided the funds for this experiment.
In this experiment we will ask you to read instructions that explain the decision scenarios you
will be faced with. We will also ask you to answer questions that test your understanding of what
you read. Finally, you will be asked to make decisions that will allow you to earn money. Your
28The instructions are those in Treatment CTG/I (see footnote 5). The instructions of the other treatments are
available upon request. We conducted at least two sessions of each treatment at each of the two locations (UCL/York).
Some of the treatments at York were conducted in parallel as part of a large session. In these, the participants received
di¤erent instructions, unbeknownst to them.
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monetary earnings will be determined by your decisions and the decisions of other participants in
the experiment. All that you earn is yours to keep, and will be paid to you in private, in cash, after
todays session.
It is important to us that you remain silent and do not look at other peoples work. If you
have any questions or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand, and an experimenter will
come to you. If you talk, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and you will forfeit your
earnings. Thank you.
The experiment consists of two parts, part I and part II. In each part you will anonymously
interact with another participant in the room. The participant with whom you will interact in
part I will be di¤erent from the participant with whom you will interact in part II. These two
participants will be randomly chosen by the computer. Your identity and the identities of the other
participants will not be revealed during or after the experiment.
Neither you nor the other participants will learn anyone elses decisions until the entire experi-
ment (i.e., parts I and II) is over.
In the instructions below all earnings are described in points. At the end of the experiment all
points will be converted into money. Each point is worth 2.5 pence. That is, 40 points are worth
£ 1 (equivalently, 100 points are worth £ 2.50).
This handout contains the instructions for part I. These are the same instructions that the
participant with whom you are matched in part I will receive.
PART I INSTRUCTIONS
In this part you will be interacting anonymously with another participant in this room. The
decision scenario thus involves two participants called Participant Xand Participant Y. We
will inform you whether you are Participant Xor Participant Yat the end of the instructions
but before the interaction begins.
At the start of part I we will create an account for each of the participants in our experiment,
and deposit 100 points into each account. At the end of the experiment, all points in the accounts
will be converted into money at the exchange rate mentioned earlier. By interacting with the other
participant in part Is decision scenario you can change the balance in your account, as follows.
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First, Participant X decides how many points s/he wants to transfer from her/his account to
Participant Ys account. The points transferred from Participant Xs account will be tripled by
the computer when deposited into Participant Ys account (in other words, Participant Y receives
three times the amount that Participant X sends).
Second, Participant Y decides how many points, out of the points that are in her/his account,
s/he wants to transfer into Participant Xs account. The number of points transferred from Partic-
ipant Ys account will be equal to the number of points deposited into Participant Xs account (in
other words they will not be tripled). This concludes the interaction, and both participants will
later exchange the points in their accounts for money.
Both participants will be asked to announce a transfer share (as a percentage) of points in their
account that they want to transfer to the other participants account, instead of deciding on the
number of points that they want to transfer. That is, Participant X will announce the share of
her initial balance of 100 points that s/he wants to transfer to Participant Y. Participant Y will
also announce the share of the number of points in her/his account that s/he wants to transfer to
Participant X. However, when making her/his decision, Participant Y will not know what share
Participant X has transferred. Hence, Participant Y will not know the precise balance in her
account (which will be equal to her/his initial balance of 100 points plus three times the number
of points transferred by Participant X) when making her/his decision.
Both participants have to announce transfer shares that lie between 20% and 80% of the balance
in their accounts. Since Participant Xs account has an initial balance of 100 points her/his transfer
share will correspond to a number of points between 20 and 80. These points will leave the account
of Participant X and will be tripled when deposited into Participant Ys account. Participant Y will
therefore receive a number of points between 60 and 240, which will be added to the 100 points in
her account. In sum, Participant Y will have between 160 and 340 points in her account, of which
s/he can transfer a share between 20% and 80%. These points will be transferred from Participant
Ys account and will be deposited into Participant Xs account.
Both participants will be prompted by the computer to enter their decisions, expressed as
percentages anywhere between (but including) 20% and 80%. We will refer to the decisions as Xs
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TRANSFER SHAREand Ys TRANSFER SHARE.
When Participant X chooses Xs TRANSFER SHARE s/he will not know Ys TRANSFER
SHARE. Equally, when Participant Y chooses Ys TRANSFER SHARE s/he will not know Xs
TRANSFER SHARE.
There is one important detail about the transfer out of Participant Ys account. The computer
adjusts the share that is actually transferred from Participant Ys account to Participant Xs
account. More specically, the computer will adjust Ys transfer share in a random way, increasing
or reducing it by up to 20 percentage points. That is, the computer will generate a number that
we call CHANGE TO Ys TRANSFER SHAREby picking a random percentage number among
-20%, -19%, . . . , 0%, . . . , +19%, +20%. Each of the whole-numbered percentages in this range is
equally likely.
The number drawn by the computer cannot be inuenced by the participants.
Therefore, the total share that is sent out of Participant Ys account, and that we call Ys
ADJUSTED TRANSFER SHARE, is equal to:
Ys ADJUSTED TRANSFER SHARE=Ys TRANSFER SHARE + CHANGE TOYs TRANS-
FER SHARE
Ys ADJUSTED TRANSFER SHARE is a percentage number between 0% and 100%. (Please
note that if the CHANGE TO Ys TRANSFER SHARE is a negative number, e.g. -20%, then
its absolute value (in the example, 20%) will be subtracted from Ys TRANSFER SHARE even
though it is added (+) in the above formula. Adding a negative number is like subtracting its
absolute value.)
Before the interaction starts, the computer will inform Participant X about the randomly drawn
value of the CHANGE TO Ys TRANSFER SHARE. S/he will see an announcement on the screen,
stating,
The computers randomly drawn CHANGE TO PARTICIPANT Ys TRANSFER SHARE is
XX%.
(XX is the randomly chosen number between -20 and 20.)
Therefore, Participant X will know the CHANGE TO Ys TRANSFER SHARE drawn by the
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computer before making her/his decision. However, participant Y will not her/himself be informed
of the CHANGE TO Ys TRANSFER SHARE drawn by the computer, before making her/his
decision.
Importantly, keep in mind that it is Ys ADJUSTED TRANSFER SHARE that determines the
exact transfer from Y to X. When making her/his decision, Participant X will know one of the two
components of this share (the random draw by the computer) but s/he will not know Participant
Ys TRANSFER SHARE.)
If you have any questions about the instructions please raise your hand.
(END OF PART I HANDOUT)
Understanding Test:
Before we proceed we ask you to answer the following ve questions. Once you have answered
all of them correctly, you will move on to the decision stage of Part I.
Please note that we make a calculator available to you on the screen. You can access the
calculator by clicking on the Calculator icon. The calculator will remain available throughout the
experiment.
You will receive immediate feedback when you submit your answer to each of the questions. If
your answer is incorrect you will be asked to try again, and as many times as you need. However,
after several failed attempts please raise your hand and we will come to your desk to explain any
open questions.
1. The initial balance in both participants accounts is 100 points. Suppose that you are
Participant X, and you choose
Xs TRANSFER SHARE = Q1X %[subject specic random number].
How many points will be in the account of Participant Y, available for him/her to transfer to
you? _______
Please click OK.
[In case of a mistake an error screen appears, saying "Your answer is not correct. Please try
again. If you need help, raise your hand and an experimenter will come to your desk.Likewise for
all other questions.]
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2. The initial balance in both participants accounts is 100 points. Suppose that you are
Participant Y, and Participant X chooses
Xs TRANSFER SHARE = Q2X%[subject specic random number].
How many points will be in your account, available to transfer to him/her? _______
Please click OK.
3. The initial balance in both participants accounts is 100 points. Suppose that you are
Participant X, and you choose
Xs TRANSFER SHARE = Q3X%[subject specic random number].
How many points will be in the account of Participant Y, available for him/her to transfer to
you? _______
Please click OK.
4. The initial balance in both participants accounts is 100 points. Suppose that you are
Participant X and you choose
Xs TRANSFER SHARE = Q4X%[subject specic random number].
Suppose further that the other participant (Y) chooses
Ys TRANSFER SHARE = Q4Y%[subject specic random number],
and that the computers random adjustment is
CHANGE TO Ys TRANSFER SHARE= T4%[subject specic random number].
How many points will you have in your account after both transfers? ____
Please click OK.
5. The initial balance in both participants accounts is 100 points. Suppose that you are
Participant X and you choose
Xs TRANSFER SHARE = Q4X%[Q4 subject specic random number].
Suppose further that the other participant (Y) chooses
Ys TRANSFER SHARE = Q4Y%[Q4 subject specic random number],
and that the computers random adjustment is
CHANGE TO Ys TRANSFER SHARE= T5%[subject specic random number].
How many points will you have in your account after both transfers? ____
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Please click OK.
You have completed the understanding test successfully. Please note that none of the numbers
that were given in the above questions are meant to be suggestive of what anyone may want to
decide in this experiment. They only serve as an illustration, for the sake of the understanding
test.
Please click OK.
This is the DECISION STAGE - Part I.
You are PARTICIPANT X.
The computers randomly drawn CHANGE TO Ys TRANSFER SHARE is
CHANGE TO Ys TRANSFER SHARE = DX% [subject specic random number]
Please enter your transfer share (a percentage between 20% and 80%):
Xs TRANSFER SHARE = ______%
If for some reason you want to change your decision, simply re-enter a new number. You have to
conrm your decision (by clicking the OK button) to make it nal. Once you conrm your decision
you will not be able to change it.
[Screen for the Trustee, with instrument:]
This is the DECISION STAGE - Part I.
You are PARTICIPANT Y.
Please enter your transfer share (a percentage between 20% and 80%):
Ys TRANSFER SHARE = ______%
If for some reason you want to change your decision, simply re-enter a new number. You have to
conrm your decision (by clicking the OK button) to make it nal. Once you conrm your decision
you will not be able to change it.
7.1 Survey
Please provide the information requested below, but do not write your name. (Please respond
truthfully, to support us in our research. You can be assured that all information will be stored in
a 100% anonymous way, ensuring your privacy.
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Age:___ Sex:______ Nationality: _______________
Undergraduate___ Graduate___ Year of study _____.
Main Subject of Study _______________
Your average monthly budget, including all expenses for food and lodging: _____________
Do you currently work for money? ____________
Please indicate your main source of income: ________________________
In your household, do you live (check all that apply): ____with parents _____alone
_____with partner _____with children ______none of the aforementioned, but sharing
an apartment with someone else.
Did you take a mathematics course as an undergraduate? ____yes ____no
Indicate the duration of schooling that your mother received, including any higher education, by
checking the number of years that comes closest: ____4 ___8 ____12 ____16 _____20
Indicate your fathers years of schooling: ____4 ____8 ____12 ____16 _____20
PLEASE ASSESS THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS. PLEASE TICK ONE OPTION FOR
EACH STATEMENT:
Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that one cannot be too
careful in dealing with people?
___ Most people can be trusted.
___ Cant be too careful.
___ Dont know.
Suppose that in the local city centre you loose your wallet with £ 500 inside. A random person
that you do not know nds it. S/he does not know you, but s/he is aware that the money belongs to
you and knows your name and address. S/he can keep the money without incurring any punishment.
What do you think is the probability that s/he will return the money to you? Report a number
between 0 and 100, where 0 means that the money will not be returned for sure, and 100 means
that it will be returned for sure. ________
How good are you in detecting people who are trustworthy?
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___ Not good at all.
___ Not very good.
___ Good.
___ Very good.
___ I dont know.
THE FOLLOWING ARE SOME NUMERICAL PROBLEMS. PLEASE ANSWER THEM AS
WELL AS YOU CAN.
First problem: What is 15% of 1,000? ______
Second problem: A car rental agency charges $35 a day plus $0.14 per mile for its rental cars.
If these charges include tax, what is the total cost of travelling 300 miles over 3 days in a car rented
from this agency?
_____$42 _____$105 ______$125 _____$147 _____$300
Third problem: Which of the following is larger than 3/5?
_____19/35 ______13/20 ______4/7 ______7/13 _____None of the above
Fourth problem: If it takes 5 people 5 months to save a total of $5,000, how many months
would it take 100 people to save a total of $100,000? _______
Fifth problem: A TV and a radio cost $110 in total. The TV costs $100 more than the radio.
How much does the radio cost? _________
Sixth problem: In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Each day, the patch doubles in size. If it
takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover
half of the lake? __________
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